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JUDGING GOD BY "HUMAN" STANDARDS: 
REFLECTIONS ON WILLIAM JAMES' 
VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 
Petter Tumulty 
Contrary to religious fundamentalism, James insists on judging religion by 
human standards. Fundamentalists would object on two counts: i) a truly 
religious person must be willing to sacrifice everything, even reason itself, 
on the altar of faith; and ii) James reduces religion to a mere conventionalism 
by presuming to apply to it the very human standards religion itself must 
judge. 
The first response shows piety itself requires the autonomy of reason. The 
second shows James fully appreciates the critical role religion has played in 
our social evolution. However, this leads into a paradox, given our first 
argument, which is resolved if we accept at least the possibility, as James 
did, of a friendly relation between the divine and the human. 
Introduction: 
The growth in political influence of religious fundamentalism around the 
world has added a degree of timeliness to certain timeless issues in the 
philosophy of religion. 1 I would like to examine certain aspects of the relation 
between faith and reason that fundamentalism highlights using elements in 
William James' Varieties of Religious Experience (hereafter: VRE) as my 
starting point not only because of James' special position at the source of the 
modern science or psychology of religion, but primarily because of my own 
overall sympathy with his ideas.2 
In preparing to address his central concern, the value of religious experi-
ence, James devotes the first 13 lectures of VRE to answering what he terms 
the "existential question" by describing varieties of religious phenomena, 
including his justifiably famous characterizations of the "healthy minded" 
and the "sick souL" It is in lecture 14, with the fruits of religion and the 
saintly character in vivid detail before us that James turns to the fundamental 
question of value and confronts the problem of what standards are to be used 
in passing judgment on the significance of religious experience. 
James rejects emphatically the use of any a priori standard and insists that 
our approach must be empirical. He develops what he means by an empirical 
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standard by claiming, in language that strikingly anticipates Hans-Georg 
Gadamer in Truth and Method, that "our general philosophic prejudices, our 
instincts, and our common sense are our only guides" (261).3 
James acknowledges that considered abstractly, it may seem to be a logical 
error to judge a 'god' or religion by the standard of human experience. For, 
he observes, if there existed a god who required child sacrifice as an expres-
sion of absolute obedience or test of faith, then it would appear reasonable 
to satisfy the god's requirement regardless of our all too human pre-under-
standings, feelings of revulsion and shared meanings. The objection would 
continue: only if one has already pre-judged the existence of such a god would 
the practice of child sacrifice appear unreasonable. 
This objection leads James to deepen his account of the empirical standard 
he employs. He admits to a kind of a priori at work in the sense that there 
are just some types of gods we "peremptorily dismiss." There are gods we 
consider "beneath us" even if they inspired at one time a type of "holy fear" 
in the hearts of our ancestors. James insists, however, that the common sense 
prejudices and instincts that are operative within us are themselves the result 
of an "empirical evolution." James describes this in terms of "the secular 
alteration that goes on in the moral and religious tone of men, as their insight 
into nature and their social arrangements progressively develop" (262). 
James' general psychological and historical point is that, from the beginning, 
the character of the god is determined by human needs. James, the pragmatist, 
insists that we can and do believe only in a god that we can use. "The gods 
we stand by are the gods we need and can use, the gods whose demands on 
us are reinforcements of our demands on ourselves and on one another" (264). 
As our needs "evolve" so do our gods.4 
While supplying some elaborations and making some qualifications, I 
would like to explore and to support James' effort to judge god by "human" 
standards that have changed and developed over time. Such an exploration 
soon leads to the traditional problem of attempting to reconcile the autonomy 
of reason with the demands of religious faith. I will limit myself in this paper 
to the problem as viewed from the perspective of what can be called the 
"challenge" of the religious "right" or "fundamentalism." I mean by funda-
mentalism a religious outlook one of whose elements is the systematic and 
unyielding insistence upon the sacrifice of reason to religious faith. 5 On this 
view, any effort on behalf of the autonomy of reason6 expresses sinful human 
pride. I would like to bring out the significance of James' effort by responding 
to two closely related objections: i) any correct conception of the religious 
requires the willingness to sacrifice reason on the altar of faith if one is to 
be an authentically religious person; and ii) James undercuts the role of 
religion as a "sign of contradiction" and reduces it to a prosaic convention-
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alism by limiting our standards of evaluation to "our general philosophic 
prejudices, our instincts, and our common sense." 
First Objection: 
While I will use Kierkegaard to illustrate the first objection, it is a view 
within the Christian tradition that goes back at least to Tertullian in the second 
century, and it finds enthusiastic spokesmen in the Middle Ages in St. Ber-
nard, St. Peter Damian, and those among the Franciscans who were called 
the "Spirituals.'" 
In Fear and Trembling (1843) Kierkegaard (or rather, Johannes de Silentio) 
seeks among other things to distinguish the ethical person from the truly 
religious person. It is in this context that Kierkegaard recalls the well known 
story of God commanding Abraham to sacrifice Isaac (Genesis, ch. 22). 
Abraham serves Kierkegaard as the paradigm of a person of religious faith 
precisely because his obedience to God knew no human limits, including and 
especially that of the moral law, a law that, in Kant's phrase, reason gives to 
itself. The central idea of the fundamentalist is that absolutely nothing must 
come between the person striving to be truly religious and God.8 
This is not a problem James addresses directly since such a "sanguinary 
deity," as noted above, is "peremptorily dismissed" as falling below the 
common sense level of our modern feelings and pre-understandings. As we 
have seen, James does not so much argue as state that we have always 
believed in the gods we can use and that a despotic god, however useful to 
our ancestors, no longer meets our psychological needs as they have currently 
evolved. However, I believe a more complete and, I hope, interesting argu-
ment(s) can be constructed by drawing on various elements in the VRE and 
making explicit some of the relevant constituents within our modem shared 
pre-understandings. 
In his lecture on "Saintliness," James presents what he claims to be "a 
certain composite photograph of universal saintliness, the same in all reli-
gions ..... (220). James describes the first characteristic as a "feeling of being 
in a wider life than that of this world's selfish little interests; and a convic-
tion, not merely intellectual, but as it were sensible, of the existence of an 
Ideal Power." The second characteristic is a "sense of the friendly continuity 
of the ideal power with our own life, and a willing self-surrender to its 
control." 
We find in James' saint "a willing self-surrender," but with the crucial 
addition that the saint believes to be good (and hence ideal) the power to 
which she surrenders. And it is not logically possible for the standard of 
judgment used, at least implicitly, by such a person to be the god or the god's 
will to whom she would surrender without begging the question of whether 
she ought to surrender to such a god. This recalls Kant's point in the Ground-
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ing for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) that "Even the Holy One of the 
gospel must first be compared with our ideal of moral perfection before he 
is recognized as such."9 
A fundamentalist might claim that this response is itself circular. The 
question concerning authentic religious faith is whether it is appropriate to 
judge the infinite Creator by His creature's finite (and corrupt) human reason 
and that question is begged when the person begins by asking whether she 
ought to surrender to Him. 
A Jamesian could respond that there is a circularity here but it is not 
vicious. It comes to no more than maintaining that reason must determine its 
own limits. So, in this case, when reason presumably is addressed with a 
command to suspend its operation, or invited to make an act of "willing 
self-surrender" there is no non-arbitrary alternative to having reason inquire 
into the legitimacy of the command or invitation. We could understand that 
the person trying to decide whether to surrender to such a god is in effect 
asking whether a god is God. 1o (I point out in what immediately follows that 
according to the mainstream of our tradition the true or legitimate God is 
both good and wise.) 
Whether we turn to the Greek or to the Hebrew sources of the Western 
Christian tradition, i.e., to Plato or Moses, God is understood to be essentially 
good, in a sense that includes justice as well as beneficence. We find Plato 
in the Republic censoring the poets precisely because they fail to tell the truth 
about the gods, viz. that "the god is good in truth and must be so repre-
sented."l1 And in the Hebrew Scriptures we find the people receiving the 
Divine Law at Sinai only after Yahweh has demonstrated His particular con-
cern for the good of these people by liberating them from their slavery and 
then feeding them in the desert (Exodus, chs. 12-24).12 
In addition to being good, God is also traditionally understood to be wise. 
And, reacting to the Enlightenment's excessive attack on authority, Gadamer 
in Truth And Method, has correctly noted the connection between (legitimate) 
authority and knowledge: authority is not based "on the subjection and abdi-
cation of reason but on recognition and knowledge-knowledge, namely, that 
the other is superior to oneself in judgment and insight and that for this reason 
his judgment takes precedence .... "13 
It is in this sense that the issue is one of reason judging its own limits. 
Reason, as the faculty of self-awareness, is presumably capable of discovering 
at least some of the conditions for its proper activity. And certainly one 
important empirical lesson is the value of the virtue of docility, and at appro-
priate times the duty of obedience, when before a genuine authority. And if 
there is a being infinitely surpassing us in wisdom and goodness, then reason 
could see the obligatory character of following such a being's commands. 
An analogy would be the obedience a young child owes to wise and good 
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parents. (Passages such as Luke 11:2 and Romans 8: 16-17 warrant the appro-
priateness of such an analogy between the human and the divine for those 
in the Christian tradition.) John Locke, responding in chapter VI of his 
Second Treatise of Government to absolute monarchists who tried to justify 
their position by invoking the model of the family, neatly turned the tables 
by explaining parental authority in terms of the child's future autonomy. In 
a religious context, a similar point could be made. We owe God obedience 
for our own sake. (This motive need not be our only one nor is it necessarily 
incompatible with giving glory to God. It would depend on one's under-
standing of our relationship with God.) And here we have one of those 
pragmatic tests upon which James properly insists. If, in the course of 
following our god, we do not judge ourselves to be growing in wisdom 
and goodness, then we need to inquire whether we are following the 
legitimate or true God. Children are obligated to obey their parents only 
for the sake of their own growth towards maturity. Hence, the obligatory 
character of the commands of parents or God always depends upon satis-
fying certain at least implicit validity claims which it must always be open 
to reason to examine, at least in principle, in order that the authority be 
judged as legitimate. 
Of course, there is no clear and distinct rule to follow in deciding whether 
it is our conception of God or of the good that needs development. This type 
of ambiguity, which recurs at critical junctures in discussions such as this, 
the fundamentalist refuses to acknowledge as a possibility by positing a 
"rigid" conception of "god" which is willfully kept above critique. 
Admitting such problems is to begin to understand the full importance of 
the autonomy of reason. 14 I would want to argue that the only solution is the 
development of what Aristotle called phronesis and Plato termed "philosoph-
ical conversation" in the Republic. (Also see the interesting point in the 
Euthyphro,7b-ge.) 
To insist on reason judging the limits to its own operation, to raise certain 
kinds of questions of legitimacy in the face of commands, divine or human, 
is to appeal to the principle of autonomy. This is one of those quasi-a prioris. 
at work in the common sense of the modern world as a result of that "empir-
ical evolution" to which James refers. It also captures a fundamental precon-
dition for a god to relate to persons or communities as persons rather than as 
objects or slaves. If a god seeks to establish a relationship with us as persons, 
as in a covenant relation, at the heart of the relation would have to be respect 
for the autonomy of the individual and the community, in other words, it must 
be on terms which we can recognize and freely accept upon deliberation, at 
least in principle. This expresses one of the shortcomings of an Ockhamist 
understanding of God which focuses on God's infinite power. If power were 
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the only basis for our obedience to God, our obedience would be a matter of 
expediency rather than obligation. 
More concretely, as James carefully notes in his discussion of the excesses 
of saintly characteristics, especially the excess of devotion in the fanatic, 
history (and current events) all too often disclose that it is easier for many 
human beings to prove their obedience to their god even though it requires 
cruelty to others and even to themselves than to engage in the quest for the 
god they ought to obey in truth. In fact, the fanatic will often measure the 
degree of his devotion by the vigilance, determination, and even ingenuity 
he shows in suppressing any doubts his reason might be tempted to entertain. 
"Spiritual excitement takes pathological forms," writes James, "whenever 
other interests are too few and the intellect too narrow" (271). 
Of course, the principle of autonomy does not imply that we are free to 
judge any and every aspect of God's activity. There are limits to any human 
being's competency as the Book of Job or as Christ's rebuke of Peter (Mark 
8:33) reminds us. However, it is clear that to the extent God can be said to 
require legitimately our faith and our obedience He must make at least an 
implicit appeal to our reason, to our common understandings of wisdom and 
goodness. To be truly religious we must serve the true god, which means, 
among other things, we must always be prepared to inquire upon good reason 
whether our god is God. And this God Himselfmust require a/us to the extent 
that He can be said to seek to relate to us as persons in truth. This is perhaps 
why genuine autonomy is an ethical ideal which one could argue is filled 
with religious significance for the person of mature faith. In fact, if we think 
in terms of the traditional view of the natural law as the participation/embod-
iment in the natures of things of the Divine or Eternal Law, and if true 
autonomy is the undistorted expression of the nature of the human logos, then 
it would not be simply a piece of rhetoric, though to modem ears it most 
definitely would sound paradoxical, to say that God Himself commands gen-
uine autonomy. 
Consider the way Aguinas puts the matter in the Summa Theologicae, I-II, 
Q.XCI, a.2: 
..... since all things subject to Divine providence are ruled and measured by 
the eternal law, in so far as, namely, from its being imprinted on them, they 
derive their respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends. Now among 
all others, the rational creature is subject to Divine providence in the most 
excellent way, in so far as it partakes of a share of providence, by being 
provident both for itself and for others. Therefore it has a share of the Eternal 
Reason, by which it has a natural inclination to its due act and end; and this 
participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural 
law." 
Some moderns would see efforts to reconcile any theory of the natural law 
with autonomy as trying to square the circle. The problem cannot be solved 
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here, but everything depends on one's understanding of how the rational 
creature, in Aquinas' words, participates in Divine providence. Perhaps, we 
are by nature suited to create certain types of meaning, though not every 
creation possible is compatible with remaining in friendly continuity with the 
Divine. Using the image of a playwright (with its real limitations), we could 
say that traditionally the natural law was viewed as a script written by God 
and "autonomy" in this context was limited to our freedom to follow or not 
follow the script. In the modern period, with our view of nature and culture 
radically altered by the natural and human sciences, it becomes possible to 
conceive of our participation in providence in the manner of sharing with 
God the role of playwright, and hence, significantly deepening our under-
standing of autonomy. The "loss" of a given, determinate "script" to follow 
which is the necessary result of the struggle against naive consciousness (and 
false or ungodly gods) does raise the specter of nihilism, but may also be a 
constitutive element in the invitation to participate in life as a meaning-giver. 
But again, not all meaning-creations are compatible with remaining in 
friendly continuity with the Divine. 
Second Objection: 
Our fundamentalist critic might respond by gently observing that we should 
not confuse fundamentalism and fanaticism; they need not be the same thing. 
The twentieth century has produced a bumper crop of secular fanatics like 
Stalin and Pol Pot. He would also firmly but quietly insist that much of what 
has been said still begs the question. The claim that reason must be the judge 
of its own limits, the appeal to autonomy is not a way to justify James' appeal 
to human standards in judging religion but rather the Enlightenment version 
of precisely that same appea1. 1S And he might conclude by making some 
points of his own: by using human standards to judge religion, hasn't James 
effectively removed those standards from criticism by religion? James' posi-
tion implies that religion either supports our standards or is dismissed by 
those same standards as "beneath US."16 This closes off what many, and not 
just fundamentalists, would consider to be one of the major historical sources 
for reason's own development. Doesn't a position like James' reduce religion 
to a form of conventionalism merely blessing the status quo? Of course, this 
is our second objection and James' own language would seem to reinforce 
the concern expressed when he claims that our only guide is "our general 
philosophic prejudices, our instincts, and our common sense." In addition, as 
we saw above, when James first introduces the idea of the empirical evolution 
of the standards of human reason he writes as if it were an entirely secular 
process. 
We can begin building a response in defense of James by observing that in 
reality James does emphasize the essential and vital role which saints have 
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had and continue to have in moving forward that "empirical evolution" of a 
society's common sense (esp. 283-85; 295-97) in the course of his discussion 
of "The Value of Saintliness" (lects. 14-15). As he develops his argument it 
is clear that James sees the importance of religion for human life precisely 
in its ability to challenge the status quo. For instance, in speaking of the 
saint's charity and non-resistance James says: "He is an effective ferment 
of goodness, a slow transmuter of the earthly into a more heavenly order" 
(285). And when he compares the saint with the Nietzschean strong man 
(293-297), James declares the saint to be the higher type of man, at least in 
the abstract, "because he is adapted to the highest society conceivable, 
whether that society ever be concretely possible or not" (296). James is very 
much aware of the saint's role as a sign of contradiction to the world, and 
his final evaluation of the positive worth of religion for human life is based 
in large measure on that role. 
Considering passages such as these, a critic might be persuaded that James 
does not intend to reduce religion to a form of conventionalism. But the 
response raises another question. Is there no paradox in insisting on employ-
ing human standards to evaluate religion and then to arrive at a strong affir-
mation of religion's value based essentially upon religion's role in elevating 
those same standards of humanity? Is the question being begged? How can 
one judge religion by standards already affected (infected?) by religion? 
James does not address this, not because he is oblivious to some possible 
flaw in his argument, but rather, because the paradox is a natural result of 
his own beliefs concerning the reality of the divine, our friendly continuity 
with this ideal power and the nature of a perfect society as a community of 
friends. This last claim is a central part of his argument on behalf of the saint 
against the Nietzschean strong man (296). 
If we draw upon Aristotle's account of friendship we may be able to clarify 
the situation. 17 Certainly, we are capable of and do evaluate, however fallibly, 
the various kinds of relationships into which we enter. In those relationships 
which Aristotle would term "friendship of utility," the standard of evaluation 
would be a cluster of efficiency considerations which are extrinsic to the 
selves involved, i.e., the relationship is impersonal. Also, in such relation-
ships, we recognize the interest that the agent with whom we are dealing has 
in influencing our standard(s) by defining our needs for us, e.g., advertising. 
In this context of utility relations it is critical from our own perspective that 
the standard we use actually be our own and not that of the other. In fact, to 
the extent that our standard has been tampered with by the other without our 
understanding and agreement we have been manipulated and treated as a 
means rather than respected as an end by the other. 
However, the situation is radically different in the case of what we can call 
perfect or genuine friendship. The relationship is by its very nature personal 
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in the sense that the character and being of the selves involved are at the 
center of the relation. In such cases, the standard of evaluation of the rela-
tionship, like the relationship itself, is intrinsic to the self. When we are 
evaluating relationships of this particular kind it is not possible to employ a 
standard that is simply our own without qualification in contrast with that of 
the other. The friend is "another self." 
The question such an evaluation poses is precisely whether we can affirm 
upon reflection the developments in our selves, and our standards, brought 
about by our sharing our lives with our friends. And what better basis for 
affirming the value of our friends than that they have empowered us to live 
more meaningful lives in accordance with higher standards? It may be para-
doxical, but we use our standards to evaluate our friends. And our most 
significant friends are those who have elevated our standards and ourselves. 
Those of whom we can approve upon reflection and to whom we are most 
grateful are the ones who refused to allow us to "lie in spiritual stagnancy." 
Our dearest friends are "vivifiers and animators of potentialities of goodness 
which but for them would lie forever dormant [in us] ... " (284). Such evalu-
ations are difficult, and we are subject to error from a number of causes. And 
we can often learn from such errors. Most certainly we do not make such 
judgments from some a-historical, absolute standpoint. But we can, and, in 
fact, as a practical necessity, must make them. 
Admittedly, the situation is more complicated when the one extending 
friendship to us is our superior in goodness and wisdom. Such spiritual 
realities as "authority," "commands," "obedience" and "faith" grow in sig-
nificance with the distance between ourselves and the friend. The obvious, 
though not simple, empirical example, already mentioned above, is the rela-
tion between the parent and the child. In the beginning, the child is not 
capable of recognizing its needs. However, the central fact in determining 
what needs to be done is the child herself, with her capacity to grow in 
wisdom and the virtues. And this necessarily means developing the genuine 
autonomy of the child. It is only in and through that development that the 
child can come to understand what it is to be a person, the true sense in which 
its friend over the years has been a friend, and so how she too can be a true 
friend with, if necessary, a legitimate claim to authority and faith. 
Also, such a person will have come to understand why, ifthe saint is correct 
about the existence of a being who infinitely surpasses us in wisdom and 
goodness, and the possibility of our entering into "friendly continuity" with 
it, such a being would have endowed us with reason, a capacity for autonomy 
in the first place, and extended an invitation that unavoidably makes an appeal 
to our faith to begin an eternal journey with our friend across the infinite 
distance to our friend. Such a faith, far from seeing autonomy as a threat or 
temptation, would view the development of autonomy as a religious vocation 
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as well as a moral obligation. And, as the argument in VRE attempts to 
establish, reason could view such a faith as a vital ally in the disenchanted 
world of modernity. 
Conclusion: 
In conclusion, we have examined two related objections from the religious 
"right" or fundamentalism to James' effort in VRE to evaluate religion ac-
cording to human standards. Of course, answering the religious right is only 
one part of the effort to articulate within modern culture a persuasive religious 
humanism. 
However, I believe philosophers like William James can help us to see how 
truly ungodlike the god of fundamentalism really is. To serve the true God 
we must criticize the "idols of our tribe" using as our pragmatic standard 
their usefulness in developing, or even liberating, what is best in ourselves. 
"The tree can be told by its fruit" (Mt. 12:34). And again, "I have come so 
that they may have life and have it to the full" (In. 10: 10). 
"The whole drift of my education goes to persuade me that the world of 
our present consciousness is only one out of many worlds that exist...[and] 
By being faithful in my poor measure to this over-belief, I seem to myself to 
keep more sane and true" (401). James closes the VRE asking whether it might 
not be of use to God in carrying out His own greater tasks to have individuals 
like ourselves faithfully living in accordance with our own over-beliefs. 
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2. William James, Varieties of Religious Experience (New York: Collier Books, 1961). 
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of the text. 
3. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth And Method (New York: Crossroad, 1984), pp. 235-74. 
As explained in the previous note, the page number provided in parentheses in the body 
of the text is for VRE. 
4. Richard Bernstein, in distinguishing various senses of "practical," has observed how 
the critics always seemed to give the worst possible interpretation to terms like "work" or 
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"use" in the writings of the Pragmatists. See his account of praxis in Praxis and Action 
(philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), esp. pp. X and 173. 
Another, not entirely unrelated point, is to observe the peculiarity of those type of 
objections to religion based on the "discovery" of certain human needs that the gods fulfill. 
One can understand the claim that given the human condition, if the gods did not exist we 
would have to invent them. But this is an insight into (alienated) human nature and not 
an argument against the gods' existence. Our need for the gods is ambiguous with respect 
to their actual existence. 
A last point for this note concerns James' use of the tenn "evolve" in this context. James 
is not saying that our standards change in some mindless way according to the blind 
workings of Darwinian mechanisms of variation and natural selection. I take it that is 
precisely the force of his reference to our growing insight into the nature of the world and 
society, in the quote given above, as the basis for the development of our standards. 
See Richard Bernstein's Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, 
and Praxis (philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), pp. 66-69, for a brief 
statement of the issues involved in making sense of the development or evolution of 
standards. 
5. This characterization may be inadequate beyond the limited purposes of this paper. 
It may be a mistake in other contexts not to carefully distinguish among fundamentalists, 
anti-intellectualists, fideists and those who might be called irrationalists. 
Also, those who limit the meaning of "fundamentalism" to a certain approach to sacred 
writings, whether the Hebrew Scriptures, the New Testament, the Koran, etc. may feel that 
I am still mis-describing my target. However, the "religious" call for the sacrifice of reason 
in this context is simply embodied in the systematic suppression or ignoring of historical-
critical studies applied to the particular tradition's sacred text(s). In the Roman Catholic 
tradition the barriers to such studies began to come down with Pope Pius XII's Divino 
AjJlante Spiritu (1943). 
6. I mean by "autonomy" to include more than simply negative freedom. It includes 
positive notions of self-expression, as well as rights of non-interference, which will require 
certain types of appropriate dependencies. 
7. Etienne Gilson, Reason and Revelation In The Middle Ages (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1938), pp. 8 & 12-13. 
8. In fairness to Kierkegaard, and the complexity of the issues involved, it should be 
noted that the concept of reason he opposes is that of Hegel, as Kierkegaard interprets 
him. However, on anyone's interpretation, Hegel does subordinate religion to philosophy. 
Perhaps, Kierkegaard's intention in focusing on the Abraham story is shaped in part by 
a desire to counter explicitly the growing trend toward subordinating religion (Christian-
ity) to practical reason (ethics). This is the theme in such influential works as Gotthold 
Lessing's Nathan the Wise (1779) and Kant's Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone 
(1793). 
9. Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1981), trans. James W. Ellington, p. 21 (p. 408 in the Academy 
edition). 
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10. John Locke raises the same issue in his criticism of the ~Enthusiasts~: An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. Iv, ch. XIX, sec. 10. 
11. Plato, Plato's Republic (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1974) trans. 
by G. M. A. Grube, p. 49 (p. 379 in the Stephanus edition). 
12. In the case of Plato it is clear that the sense of ~good" is moral. Perhaps it is not so 
clear in the case of Exodus. One could keep a covenant out of narrow self-interest or 
gratitude for the promotion of private and/or sectarian interests. However, in other parts 
of scripture, such as the psalms and the writings of the prophets, it is clear that God is 
essentially concerned with justice. 
13. Truth and Method, p. 248. Gadamer continues: "Authority in this sense, properly 
understood, has nothing to do with blind obedience to a command. Indeed, authority has 
nothing to do with obedience, but rather with knowledge." 
14. This also captures the basic reason why Kierkegaard felt that Hegelian rationalism 
was an illusion. Kierkegaard was right in seeing ~anxiety~ as an inescapable part of the 
human condition which we are constantly trying to escape. 
(I do mean to assert intrinsic relations between the Platonic idea of dialectic, the 
Aristotelian idea of phronesis, the Kantian idea of autonomy and the Kierkegaardian idea 
of "anxiety.~) 
Also, see note 15. 
15. I believe the objection must be granted, at least in the limited sense that there is no 
neutral, objective, sufficiently determinate standard to which one can appeal to decide the 
argument between the fundamentalist and the philosopher; hence, this type of objection 
would apply to both disputants. So, is there an "argument"? Yes. But not the kind that can 
be settled by the application of an impersonal system of deductive or inductive rules by 
a formally competent subject. It is the most interesting type of argument precisely because 
its solution cannot be detached from the way the subject chooses to define herself, and 
partially determines the type of relations into which she can enter. (I am reminded of 
Plato's discussions in the Republic of types of character and, of course, of Kierkegaard's 
stages and his notion of truth as subjectivity.) 
It is a mistake, common enough, to view any commitment to autonomy as subordinating 
faith to reason. However, the life of reason, the human logos, manifestly requires faith; 
and the development of faith requires reason. All of which is given concrete historical 
meaning only in a community that is the bearer of a living religious tradition. 
16. The problem posed can be developed in a "stronger~ or a "weaker" form. In the text 
I layout the "weaker" formulation, in the sense that given a choice between two competing 
standards as to which one should be primary James allegedly makes the wrong choice as 
shown by the historical record. In this note I will briefly address the "stronger" objection 
based on the religious belief that "natural~ human reason is so corrupt as to constitute no 
standard at all. 
A fairly typical fundamentalist could state the objection in terms of the radical corrup-
tion of human nature since Adam's fall and the consequent darkening of human reason. 
Any attempt by reason to assert autonomy is but an expression of its sinful nature. For us 
to be "saved," as defined by the particular religion of the fundamentalist, we have to submit 
unconditionally and unquestioningly to the divinity or its "mouthpiece" on earth. A great 
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deal of intellectual activity becomes possible, and even encouraged, after such a submis-
sion and within the religion's paradigm, in a Kuhnian sense. This is why fundamentalists 
cannot be simply identified with anti-intellectualists. Unless one stipulates that one of the 
defining marks of the intellectual is autonomy. 
This radical attack on reason has its secular analogies, e.g., in the marxist theory of 
ideology. However, it raises similar epistemological problems. The radical critic, secular 
or religious, reduces the strength of her own possible arguments which seek to distinguish 
between ideology and critique, between the angel of darkness and the angel of light in 
direct proportion to the degree of corruption of reason alleged. And those who leave the 
drawing of such distinctions in the hands of an "authority" fail, as we noted above, to 
understand the nature of authority and its dependence on the satisfaction of certain validity 
claims. 
Perhaps it is not inappropriate to add in the spirit of James' empiricism and Gadamer's 
"ontological" hermeneutics that nurturing the capacity to effectively question authority is 
itself an achievement, and even task, of legitimate authority, and hence, one of its concrete, 
historical fruits. 
17. Those familiar with Aristotle's discussion of friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics 
will also recal1 his claim in ch. 7 of Bk. VIII that friendship between the gods and human 
beings is not possible. 
The situation is once again ambiguous. On the other hand, the "Jamesian saint" might 
appreciate Aristotle's reasoning, but she would claim that her "experience," like that of 
the physicist's vacuum or impetus, simply refutes it. (James develops the parallel between 
scientific and religious thought, pp. 107-111.) However coherent and comprehensive the 
Aristotelian system may be it is not sufficient to make sense of the saint's experience. 
(Recall the second characteristic of "universal saintliness" in the text above.) On the other 
hand, the Aristotelian countercharge is that the saint is deluding herself. 
In the light of texts like John 15:12-17, Christians would resolve the ambiguity in favor 
of the saint. 
